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I. INTRODUCTION

The idea of a principle or right of self-determination is firmly
embedded in the global consciousness. As one author has aptly
observed, the concept of self-determination "has long been one of
which poets have sung and for which patriots have been ready to lay
down their lives."1 Today a multitude of indigenous, ethnic, and
other groups have invoked the concept of self-determination in
formulating demands against actual or perceived oppression of the
status quo. 2 While efforts to achieve some measure of political
autonomy are framed in terms of self-determination, so too are
movements to install or enhance democratic governance. 3
Affirmed in the U.N. Charter 4 and other major international
legal instruments, 5 self-determination was the normative grounds
by which the territories of Africa, Asia, and elsewhere broke the
6
formal bonds of colonialism and became independent states.
Although the extent to which self-determination operates as a norm
of international law beyond the decolonization context has been a
matter of much controversy, it is frequently held that selfdetermination is a generally applicable
norm of the highest order
7
within the international system.
1. John P. Humphrey, Political and Related Rights, in 1 HuMN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 193 (Theodore Meron ed., 1984).
2.

See generally MORTON

H. HALPERIN ET AL., SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW

WORLD ORDER 123-160 app. (1992) (cataloging self-determination movements
worldwide).
3. See Id.

4. U.N. CHARTER art. 1,

2.

5. See infra notes 16-18.
6. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1961). The International Court of Justice recognized self-determination as the basis for
the process of decolonization in Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (June 21)
[hereinafter Namibia Case]; Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-32 (Oct. 16). See also
AURELIU CRISTESCU, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: HISTORICAL AND
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS ON THE BASIS OF UNITED NATIONS INSTRUMENTS, at
21-24, U.N. Doc. E/CN/4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.80.XIV.3 (1981) (Cristescu
was Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities) [hereinafter U.N. STUDY ON SELF-DETER'MINATION].
7. Professors Brownlie and Hdctor Gros Espiell, for example, consider selfdetermination to bejus cogens, a peremptory norm. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 515 (4th ed. 1990); Hector Gros Espiell, SelfDetermination and Jus Cogens, in U.N. LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 167 (Antonio
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In this essay, I attempt to give concrete meaning to the abstract
notion of self-determination as a generally applicable international
norm. More particularly, my aim is to shed light on the meaning of
self-determination as it may concern the multitude of groups
worldwide that have invoked the norm. In articulating a conception
of self-determination, I deviate from the frequently invoked
methodology of dissecting the words of international instruments in
which the term self-determination appears. Such attempts have
yielded inconsistent or normatively problematic results, or have led
to formulations of the norm that do not reflect the actual behavior of
relevant international actors. 8 While taking into account the words
in written instruments, I focus here primarily on the common
ground of normative precepts and patterns of behavior that are fairly
associated with the concept of self-determination. Thus, I articulate
a norm that is comprised of widely shared values, that accounts for
the decolonization movement, and that is reflected in relevant
aspects of contemporary life in an increasingly interconnected global
community.
I first discuss the character and scope of the international norm
of self-determination. I identify the norm to be rooted in core values
of freedom and equality, to be within the realm of human rights as
opposed to sovereign rights, and to be concerned broadly with
individuals and groups as they relate to the structures of
government under which they live. I reject conceptions of selfdetermination that consider the norm to be concerned only with
"peoples" in the sense of narrowly defined, mutually exclusive
territorial or ethnically homogenous communities.
Next, I articulate the content of the norm, distinguishing the
substance of the norm from remedial prescriptions that may follow
violations of the norm. I describe the substance of the norm as
entailing two elements: First, self-determination entitles individuals
and groups to meaningful participation, commensurate with their
interests, in episodic procedures leading to the development of or
change in the governing institutional order. Secondly, selfdetermination enjoins the governing institutional order itself to be
one under which individuals and groups may live and develop freely
on a continuous basis. I demonstrate how decolonization was based
on remedial prescriptions developed in response to widely recognized
Cassese ed., 1979). See also HURST

HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-

DETERMINATION 45 (1990); PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 14 (1991); MALCOLM SHAW, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN AFRICA 90

(1986).
8. See infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text. See generally Deborah Z. Cass,
Rethinking Self-Determination:A Critical Analysis of Current InternationalLaw
Theories. 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 21 (1992).
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historical and contemporary violations of the substantive elements of
self-determination, and how the international community is capable
of promoting self-determination remedies in other contexts.
I conclude by discussing the relevance of the norm of selfdetermination to attempts at peaceful resolution of the array of
contemporary group demands. I argue for a case by case approach
which measures group claims against the substantive elements of
self-determination and which identifies appropriate remedies where
the norm has been violated.

II. THE CHARACTER AND SCOPE OF SELF-DETERMINATION
A. Generally
The concept of self-determination arises within international
law's expanding lexicon of human rights, rooted in the idea that all
human beings should be equally free to translate their impulses and
desires into action. 9 Scholars frequently cite the normative precepts
of freedom and equality invoked in the American revolt against
British rule and the overthrow of the French monarchy as
progenitors of the modern concept of self-determination. 10 Core
human rights values associated with the concept of selfdetermination, however, clearly are not solely within the province of
the history of Western thought. In his concurring opinion in the
Namibia Case before the International Court of Justice, Judge
Ammoun identified equality as a central precept of selfdetermination linked with "It]wo streams of thought... established
on the two opposite shores of the Mediterranean, a Graeco-Roman
stream represented by Epictetus, Lucan, Cicero and Marcus
Aurelius; and an Asian and African stream, comprising the monks
of Sinai and Saint John Climac, Alexandria with Plotinus and Philo
the Jew, Carthage to which Saint Augustine gave new lustre."1 1
The term self-determination gained prominence in international
political discourse around World War 1.12 President Woodrow
Wilson linked the principle of self-determination with Western
liberal democratic ideals and the aspirations of European
9. See Edward M. Morgan, The Imagery and Meaning of Self-Determination, 20
INT'L LAW & POL. 355, 357-58 (1988).

10. See, e.g., UMOZURIKE 0. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-11 (1972); Dov RONEN, THE QUEST FOR SELF-DETERMINATION
ix (1979).
11. Namibia Case, supranote 6, at 77-78.

12. See

UMOZURIKE,

supra note 10, at 11-12.

Spring 1993]

SELF-DETERMINATION

nationalists. 13 Lenin and Stalin also embraced the rhetoric of selfdetermination in the early part of this century, while viewing selfdetermination in association with Marxist precepts of class
liberation. 14 World War II gave rise to the United Nations, and "selfdetermination of peoples" was included in the U.N. Charter among
the organization's founding principles. 15 The International Human
Rights Covenants hold out self-determination as a "right" of "[a]ll
peoples"'1 6 as do the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights 17 and the Helsinki Final Act. 18
Historically, international law was concerned only with the
rights and duties of independent sovereigns, mostly disregarding the
face of humanity beyond the sovereign. 19 Under the modern rubric of
13. Id. at 13-14.
14. See VLADIMIR I. LENIN, THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION
(Progress Publishers, 4th rev. ed. 7th prtg. 1979) (1947); JOSEPH STALIN, MARXISM AND
THE NATIONAL-COLONIAL QUESTION (Proletarian Publishers 1975); see generally
WALKER CONNOR, THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN MARXIST LENINIST THEORY AND
STRATEGY (1984).
15. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, ' 2.

16. InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, 1,
G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967),
reprintedin 6 I.L.M. 360; InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, art. 1,
1, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc A/6316 (1967),
reprintedin 6 I.L.M. 368. The self-determination provision common to the International
Human Rights Covenants reads:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic social and cultural development.
Self-determination is affirmed by substantially the same language in other UNsponsored international instruments. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1514, supranote 6, $ 2; U.N.
Declarationof Principlesof InternationalLaw Concerning FriendlyRelations and CooperationAmong States in Accordance with the Charterof the United Nations, princ.
V, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Sup'p. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. No. A/8028
(1971) [hereinafter U.N. Declarationon FriendlyRelations].
17. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 20, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 59.
18. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, princ. VIII,
adoptedAug. 1, 1975, Dep't St. Pub. No. 8826, reprintedin 14 I.L.M. 1292.
19. The traditional view of international law is reflected, inter alia, in LASSA F. L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Ronald F. Roxburgh ed., 3d ed. 1920); CHARLES C.
HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED

(1922). See also Tom J. Farer, The United Nations and Human Rights: More
Than A Whimper, Less Than a Roar, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY:
ISSUES AND ACTION 227 (Richard P. Claude & Burns H. Weston eds., 2d ed. 1992)
("Until the Second World War... international law did not impede the natural right of
each equal sovereign to be monstrous to his or her subjects").
STATES
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human rights, however, international law increasingly is concerned
with upholding rights deemed to inhere in human beings
individually as well as collectively. 20 Extending from core values of
human freedom and equality, expressly associated with peoples
instead of states, and affirmed in a number of international human
rights instruments, the international norm of self-determination is
properly understood to benefit human beings as human beings and
not sovereign entities as such. 2 1 Like all human rights norms,
moreover, self-determination is presumptively universal in scope
22
and thus must be assumed to benefit all segments of humanity.
While human beings are the beneficiaries of self-determination,
the norm's objects are the institutions of government under which
they live. Self-determination is extraordinary among human rights
norms in its concern with the essential character of government
structures, a concern which may extend to the point of enjoining
them to yield authority or territory. When first articulated as a
principle of international relations around World War I, selfdetermination justified the breakup of the German, AustroHungarian, and Ottoman empires and served as a prescriptive
vehicle for the re-division of Europe in the wake of the empires'
downfall. 2 3 In its most prominent modern manifestation within the
international system, self-determination has promoted the demise of
colonial institutions of government and the emergence of a new
political order for subject peoples. 2 4 Also, the international
community through the United Nations has declared illegitimate
South Africa's governing institutional order, with its entrenched
system of apartheid, on grounds of self-determination. 25 In each of
20. See generally BURNS H. WESTON, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSE BOOK (2d ed. 1990); BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at
553-602; Richard A. Falk, Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY, supra note 19, at 31.
21. See U.N. STUDY ON SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 6, at 31, $ 220 ("The
principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples is [sic] part of the group of
human rights and fundamental freedoms"); Yoram Dinstein, Self-Determination and
the Middle East Conflict, in SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL
DIMENSIONS 243, 243 (Yonah Alexander & Robert A. Friedlander eds., 1980) ("Selfdetermination must be perceived as an international human right"); Hurst Hannum,
Self-Determination as a Human Right, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY,
supra note 19, at 175.
22. Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY, supra note 19, at 12, 17 ("If a right is determined to be a human right it is
quintessentially general or universal in character, in some sense equally possessed by
all human beings everywhere, including in certain instances even the unborn").
23. See UMOZURIKE, supra note 10, at 11-12.

24. See id. at 59-95.
25. See G. A. Res. 2775, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 39, U.N. Doc.
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these contexts, values linked with self-determination comprised a
standard of legitimacy against which institutions of government
were measured. As I will discuss below, self-determination
concerns both the procedures by which governing institutions
develop and the form they take for their ongoing functioning.
B. Implications of the Term "Peoples"
The term "peoples" as used in international instruments in
association with self-determination 2 6 indicates the collective or
group context within which the norm operates: the constitution and
functioning of the political order. The term can also be viewed as an
affirmation of the value of community bonds within and among
groups. In its plain meaning, the term "peoples" undoubtedly
embraces non-state groups such as the Miskito, the Yanomami, and
the Basque as well as groups defined by statehood boundaries like the
Nicaraguans, the Brazilians, and the Spanish. 2 7 The
characterization of self-determination as a right of "peoples,"
however, does not deny the individual as an important beneficiary of
the norm. Dov Ronen argues that it is ultimately the individual that
matters in the realization of self-determination values:
When I say that the quest for self-determination is,
basically, individual self-determination, I am not positing
a goal or making a normative judgment, but observing and
interpreting what I believe to be a fact: the most fundamental
and necessary human aggregations provide, subjectively,
individual (or personal) self-determination. Individual
self-determination, to rule one's self, to control one's own
life, is a basic given of the human existence.28
A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 3411, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 35, U.N. Doc.
A/10034 (1975); see also S.C. Res. 392, U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., at 11, U.N. Doc. S/Res/392
(1976); InternationalConvention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
"Apartheid,"G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 75, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1974).
26. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
27. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 871 (9th ed. 1989) (defining
"peoples" as "a body of persons that are united by a common culture, tradition, or sense
of kinship, that typically have common language, institutions, and beliefs, and that
often constitute a politically organized group").
28. RONEN, supra note 10, at 55 (emphasis in original). See also JOSE MARTINEZ
COBO, STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS,

vol. V, 274, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/add.4, U.N. Sales No. E.86.XIV.3 (1986)
(Martinez Cobo was Special Rapporteur to the U.N. Sub-commission on the Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities) ("The right to self-determination is also
a right of individuals, in the sense that every person has the right to self-expression and
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That the individual is in some way implicated in values associated
with self-determination would seem to hold true pursuant to any
modern formulation of those values, including
formulations based
29
upon communitarian or collectivist thought.
Many have interpreted the use of the term "peoples" in this
connection as restricting the scope of self-determination; the
international norm of self-determination is deemed only concerned
with "peoples" in the sense of a limited universe of narrowly defined,
mutually exclusive communities. Within this framework of
understanding, identifying the segments of humanity that qualify as
"peoples" is of threshold importance since only such "peoples" are
entitled to self-determination. 30 There are two dominant variants of
this approach, both of them problematic.
One variant, which generally empowers the status quo, holds
that a "people" entitled to self-determination is the whole of a
population within the generally accepted boundaries of an
independent state or a territory of a classical colonial type. 3 1 The
proposition that self-determination is concerned with the people of a
state or colonial territory is not inconsistent with the view of selfdetermination thus far suggested here, and it explains much of
international practice including decolonization. The difficulty is in
the underlying view that only such units of human aggregation-the
whole of the people of a state or colonial territory-are beneficiaries
of self-determination. This conception of the scope of selfto fulfill his or her human potential as he or she thinks best").
29. See generally WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 199-

237 (1990) (discussing communitarianism).
30. Thus, for example, in discussions within the United Nations and the
International Labour Organisation concerning indigenous populations, the issue of
whether these groups are entitled to self-determination frequently has revolved around
whether or not they are "peoples." See S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in
ContemporaryInternationalLaw, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 34 & n. 146 (1991).
31. See, e.g., ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 104 (1963) ("Self-

determination refers to the right of the majority within a generally acceptable political
unit to the exercise of power"); DAVID J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-96 (3d ed. 1993); see also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 91-93 (1979). Typical of this approach, Dr. Higgins

embraces the notion that self-determination includes internal and external aspects:
pursuant to external self-determination a state is bound to promote the demise of
colonialism and other forms of alien occupation; pursuant to internal selfdetermination a state is bound to insure that the whole of its people is in control of its
own destiny. Rosalyn Higgins, The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination:
Commentary of Professor Franck's Paper, 3-4 (1983) (unpublished manuscript for
General Course in Public International Law, Hague Academy of International Law)
(on file with author).
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determination's concern renders the norm inapplicable to the vast
number of contemporary claims of sub-state groups that represent
many of the world's most pressing problems in the post-colonial
age. 3 2 And by effectively denying a priori a right of selfdetermination to groups that in many instances passionately assert
it as a basis for their demands, this limited conception may serve to
inflame tensions. Moreover, as I will argue, an effectively statecentered conception of self-determination is anachronistic in a world
in which state boundaries mean less and less.
Proponents of a second variant restricting the term "peoples"
accept the premise of a world divided into mutually exclusive,
territorial communities. This view, however, does not necessarily
define the "peoples" entitled to self-determination by the status quo of
recognized political geography, but rather by ethnographic
characteristics embellished by accounts of historical community and
suppressed territorial sovereignty. 33 This view, frequently invoked by
self-determination claimants, partially explains the re-division 3of4
Europe at the end of World War I along ethnographic lines.
However, the view is problematic in that it overstates the value
accorded ethnicity and historical community within the
international system outside the highly charged political context of
post World War I Europe. The right of self-determination affirmed in
the decolonization context did not attach to groups by virtue of ethnic

32. See Higgins, sztpra note 31, at 4-5 (holding that sub-state groups-i.e.
"minorities" as opposed to "peoples"--are not entitled to self-determination under
international law).
33. This view has roots in the ethnonationalist thought of the early part of this

century, see W.

OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION

IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW 30-31 (1977), and is reflected in much of the literature advocating
self-determination for ethnically distinctive indigenous communities. See, e.g., Rachel
San Kronowitz et al., Comment, Toward Consent and Cooperation:Reconsidering the
PoliticalStatus of Indian Nations,22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 507, 597-600 (1987); John
Clinebell & Jim Thomson, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Rights of Native
Americans UnderInternationalLaw, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 669, 707, 710-714 (1978).
34. See generally OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 33, at 80-84 (discussing the
application of allied policy at the close df World War I).
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make up or historical sovereignty. 3 5 And the international
community has not in recent times generally responded favorably to
self-determination claims simply on the strength of ethnic cohesion
36
or accounts of historical sovereignty.
More fundamentally, both variants of the narrow conception of
the term "peoples" are flawed in their limited underlying vision of a
world divided into mutually exclusive "sovereign" territorial
communities. This vision corresponds with the traditional Western
liberal theoretical perspective that limits humanity to two perceptual
categories-the individual and the state-and which views states
according to the post-Westphalian model of mutually exclusive
spheres of territory, community, and centralized authority. 3 7 The
limited focus on "peoples," accordingly, is largely inattentive to the
multiple, overlapping spheres of community, authority, and
interdependency that actually exist in the human experience.
Humanity effectively is reduced to units of organization defined by a
perceptual grid of statehood categories; the human rights character
of self-determination is thereby obscured as is the relevance of selfdetermination values in a world that is less and less state-centered.
C. Beyond Statehood Categories
At the same time local communities are gaining greater
autonomy and new states are emerging, impulses toward greater
integration in all spheres of life abound. Virtually at the same time
the Baltic Republics gained independence from the former Soviet
Union, for example, the Republics became part of the United Nations
and its expanding web of authority and cooperation, 38 and Baltic
35. See CHRISTOPHER C. MOJEIVU, Self-Determination:The African Perspective in
SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 21,
at 221, 228-29. (Yonah Alexander & Robert A. Friedlander eds., 1980) (explaining that
U.N. policy was to pursue the independence of the colonial territories without regard to
pre-colonial political units based primarily on ethnic affinity or tribal affiliation). Cf.
Western Sahara Case, supra note 6, at 45-49, 64-68 (while acknowledging that precolonial political communities linked peoples of the Western Sahara with adjoining
Morocco and Mauritania through historical spheres of influence and allegiance, the
Court held that such "legal ties" should not influence the application of the principle of
self-determination in the decolonization of the Western Sahara).
36. See generally HALPERIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 27-46 (discussing international
responses to self-determination claims in the post-cold war era).
37. S. James Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and InternationalLaw in
Historical and Contemporary Perspective, 1989 HARVARD INDIAN LAW SYMPoSiuM 1,
197-198 (1990).
38. Three Baltic States Approved as U.N. Members, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1991, at
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leaders pronounced intentions to enter into trade alliances with
Nordic countries 39 and to seek eventual membership in the
European Community. 40 As the Miskito Indians of Nicaragua
achieve greater political autonomy, they simultaneously secure
greater representation in the Nicaraguan government; 41 and they
attempt to devolve authority to the village level 42 while opening their
isolated region to more commerce and political linkages with the
outside world. 43 And in the years following the death of its long-time
dictator Francisco Franco, Spain devolved substantial authority to
autonomous communities, 4 4 while moving toward greater

39. See EFTA Signs Cooperation Accords, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1991, at A13;
(reporting that the European Free Trade Association signed cooperative agreements
with Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltic states to speed their integration into the
European economy); R.C. Longworth, New Europe Restructures Blocs of Past, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 14, 1990, at 23 (describing a proposal for revival of the Hanseatic League, a
historic trade alliance linking Russia, the Baltic states, Scandinavia, Poland, Germany,
and the Netherlands).
40. New Europe Begins Taking Shape in Giant Common Market, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Oct. 22, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, AFP file.
41. In 1987 the Nicaraguan government adopted its Statute of Autonomy for the
Atlantic Coast Regions of Nicaragua (Law No. 28, Sept. 7, 1987) (hereinafter
Nicaraguan Statute of Autonomy], which established semi-autonomous regional
governing bodies. In 1990, the people of the autonomous regions elected delegates to
the regional governing bodies as well as to the national legislature. See Mario Rizo
Zaled6n, IdentidadEtnicay Elecciones:El Caso de la RAAN, WANI, July/Dec. 1990, at
28 (WANI is published by the Centro de Investigaciones y Documentaci6n de la Costa
Atlantica and the Universidad de Centro Am6rica) (analyzing the 1990 elections in the
autonomous regions). Upon taking office in April 1990, the newly elected president
Violeta Barrios de Chamorro established a cabinet-level agency for the autonomous
regions and appointed as its director Brooklyn Rivera, the principal leader of the
Atlantic Coast Indian organization, YATAMA. S. James Anaya, Indian Nicaraguan
Struggle Continues, 18 AMERICANs BEFORE COLUMIBUs 2 (1990) at 1 (published by the
National Indian Youth Council).
42. Pursuant to the Nicaraguan Statute of Autonomy, supra note 41, art. 23, there
are initiatives to demarcate local municipal boundaries and to formalize local authority.
See Anteproyecto de Ley de Divisi6n Politica Administrativa de la Regi6n Aut6noma
Atlhntico Norte (draft legislation developed by the Humboldt Center, Managua
Nicaragua, at the request of the Northern Autonomous Regional Councils) (on file wvith
author); Propuesta de Reglamento del Estatuto de Autonomfa de las Regiones de la
Costa Atldntica de Nicaragua (proposal developed by the Center for Research and
Documentation of the Atlantic Coast (CIDCA) in conjunction with the Northern
Autonomous Regional Council) (on file with author).
43. Interview with Brooklyn Rivera (Apr. 1992).
44. See HANNUMT, supra note 7, at 263-79 (discussing the system of regional
autonomous governments in Spain, particularly as regards the Basque Country and'
Catalonia).
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45
integration with Europe and the rest of the world.
In his article in this volume, Duane Champagne discusses the
traditional forms of political organization of the Iroquois
Confederacy and the Creek Indians of North America. 4 6 Professor
Champagne points out that these groups, typically of Native
American tribes, do not represent singular political or national
identities for the people they encompass. 4 7 He observes that both the
Iroquois and the Creek people traditionally had-and to great extent
continue to have-segmentary political structures defined by
48
kinship, geography, and function.
The political philosophy for the Iroquois Confederacy, or the
Haudenosaunee, is expressed in the Great Law of Peace, which
describes a Great Tree with roots extending in the four cardinal
directions to all peoples of the earth; all are invited to follow the roots
to the tree and join in peaceful coexistence and cooperation under its
great long leaves. 49 The Great Law of Peace promotes unity among
individuals, families, clans, and nations while upholding the
integrity of diverse identities and spheres of autonomy. 50 Similar
ideals have been expressed by leaders of other indigenous groups in
contemporary appeals to international bodies. 5 1 Such conceptions
outside the mold of classical Western liberalism would appear to
provide a more appropriate foundation for understanding humanity,
its aspirations, and its political development than the model of a
world divided into exclusive, monolithic communities, and hence a
more appropriate backdrop for understanding the subject matter of
self-determination.
To understand self-determination as concerned only with
narrowly defined, mutually exclusive "peoples" is to diminish the
relevance of self-determination values in a world that is in fact
evolving differently. Although the history of the world is of both
integration and disintegration, the overriding trend appears now to

45. See Elizabeth Pond, Spain Lays Politicaland Economic Groundwork for EC
Membership, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 24, 1980, at 10.
46. Duane Champagne, Beyond Assimilation as a Strategy for National
Integration:The Persistenceof American Indian PoliticalIdentities, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 112 (1993).
47. Id. at 112-13.
48. Id. at 112-14.
49. See Oren R. Lyons, The American Indian in the Past, in EXILED IN THE LAND OF
THE FREE 13, 14, 37-39 (Oren R. Lyons & John C. Mohawk eds., 1992).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Living History:Inaugurationof the InternationalYear of the World's
Indigeous People, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (1993) (statements by
indigenous leaders).
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be one of enhanced interconnectedness. By this observation I am not
foretelling the demise of diverse cultures or local authority, rather I
am referring to the fact of increasing linkages, commonalities, and
interdependencies among people, economies, and spheres of power.
Group challenges to the political structures that engulf them appear
to be not so much claims of absolute political autonomy as they are
efforts to secure the integrity of the group while rearranging the
terms of integration or rerouting its path. Even where secession and
independent statehood is achieved it is but a step in an ongoing
process of global interconnectedness.
Any model of self-determination that does not take into account
the larger context of multiple patterns of human association and
interdependency is at best incomplete (and is more likely distorted).
To be treated as a generally applicable human rights norm relevant
to modern trends and conditions, the international norm of selfdetermination must account for the multiple and overlapping
spheres of human association and political ordering that actually
exist. Appropriately understood, therefore, self-determination
benefits individuals and groups throughout the spectrum of
humanity's complex web of interrelationships and loyalties, and not
just groups defined by existing or perceived sovereign boundaries;
and in a world of increasingly overlapping and integrated political
spheres, self-determination concerns human beings in regard to the
constitution and functioning of all levels and forms of government
under which they live.
III. THE CONTENT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
I have identified the international norm of self-determination as
grounded in values of freedom and equality, and as applying in favor
of human beings in regard to the institutions of government under
which they live. In essence, self-determination entails a standard of
governmental legitimacy based upon core precepts of human
freedom and equality. Despite the divergence over time and space in
models of governmental legitimacy, relevant international actors at
any given point in time share a nexus of opinion and behavior about
the minimum conditions of human freedom and equality for the
constitution and functioning of government. The content of the
international norm of self-determination may be found in that more
or less identifiable nexus.
As stated at the beginning of this essay, self-determination is
widely acknowledged as the normative grounds for the
decolonization process. Given the prominence of decolonization in
the international practice of self-determination, there has been a
tendency to define self-determination by reference to the specific
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prescriptions developed in that context, 5 2 which for most of the
subject territories meant procedures resulting in independent
statehood. 5 3 Thus it has been common to link self-determination
with a right to independent statehood. 54 The proposition that selfdetermination means an international legal entitlement of
independent statehood, however, can only be taken seriously if one
accepts that self-determination only applies to "peoples" in the
narrow sense of groups defined by existing state boundaries or
colonial territories; the international community has not otherwise
generally recognized attributes of statehood or promoted the
emergence of new states. I have already discussed the difficulties
encountered by such a narrow conception of the scope of selfdetermination.
If, however, self-determination fundamentally entails a standard
of governmental legitimacy that benefits all segments of humanity, a
different interpretation of decolonization ensues: Decolonization
procedures did not themselves embody the substance of the norm of
self-determination; rather they were measures to remedy a sui
generis deviation from the norm that existed in the prior condition of
colonialism. Self-determination precepts define a standard in the
governing institutional order, a standard with which colonialism
was at odds and with which other institutions of government also
may conflict.
The substantive content of the international norm of selfdetermination, therefore, inheres in the precepts by which the
international community held colonialism illegitimate and which
apply universally to human beings in regard to their governing
institutions. The substance of the norm-the precepts that define a
standard of governmental legitimacy-must be distinguished from
the remedial prescriptions that may follow a violation of the norm,
such as those developed to undo colonization.

52. This tendency is reflected, for example, in the U.N. STUDY ON SELFsupra note 6, at 46-50.
53. See id. at 48 (discussing the "Law of Decolonization"); OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra
note 33, at 97-147 (discussing decolonization procedures in the United Nations and
general international practice).
54. HANNUM, supra note 7, at 39 (observing that "[olnce the 'self has been
identified, it is abundantly clear that full independence is considered to be the 'normal'
result of the exercise of self-determination"). Accordingly, much of the contemporary
literature concerning self-determination is focused on the question of when a group is
entitled to secede and form an independent state. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Secession
and Self-Determination:A TerritorialInterpretation,16 YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991);
Gregory Marchildon & Edward Maxwell, Quebec's Right of Secession Under
Canadianand InternationalLaw, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 583 (1992).
DETERMINATION,
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A. Substantive Aspects
The substance of the international norm of self-determination by
which the international community held colonialism illegitimate,
and which applies more generally in regards to the political order,
comprises two elements. First, in what I will call its constitutive
aspect, self-determination enjoins the episodic procedures by which
the governing institutional order comes about. Secondly, in what I
will call its ongoing aspect, self-determination applies continuously
to enjoin the form, content, and functioning of the governing order
itself.
1. Constitutive Self-Determination
In self-determination's constitutive aspect, core values of
freedom and equality translate into a requirement that individuals
and groups be accorded meaningful participation, commensurate
with their interests, in procedures leading to the creation of or
change in the institutions of government under which they live.
Constitutive self-determination does not itself dictate the outcome of
such procedures; but where they occur it imposes requirements of
participation such that the end result in the political order can be
said to reflect the collective will of the people, or peoples, concerned.
This aspect of self-determination corresponds with the provision
common to the International Human Rights Covenants and other
instruments which state that peoples "freely determine their
political status" by virtue of the right of self-determination. 5 5 It is not
possible to identify with precision the bounds of international
consensus concerning the required levels and means of individual or
group participation in all contexts of institutional birth or change.
Certain minimum standards, however, are evident.
Colonization was rendered illegitimate in part by reference to the
processes leading to colonial rule, processes that today clearly
represent impermissible territorial expansion of governmental
authority. When European powers proceeded to divide among
themselves the territories of Africa, Asia, and elsewhere and impose
their administrative structures over them, they did so with little or
no regard to the wishes of the indigenous inhabitants. 5 6 Lands not
inhabited by "civilized" peoples-that is, peoples with European
55. InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights, supra note 16,
art. 1, 1; InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, supra note 16, art. 1, T 1.
The full text of art. 1, 1 of the Covenants is quoted at note 16, supra.See also U.N.
Declarationon FriendlyRelations, princ. V, supra note 16.
56. For a description of the procedures for acquiring title adopted by European
states in the colonization of Africa, see MALCOLM SHAW, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN AFRICA
31-58 (1986).
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characteristics of social and political organization-were deemed
vacant, or 57
terra nullius, and hence open to occupation by the
"civilized." At the Berlin Conference of 1885, which has been
dubbed a meeting to moderate the "scramble for Africa," the
Europeans agreed to respect the interests of the indigenous
inhabitants. 58 This agreement, however, was pursuant to a
philosophy that viewed the indigenous Africans, like other nonEuropeans, as inferior and as needing "civilization." 59 Concern for
the interests of the indigenous inhabitants thus translated more into
justifying colonization than securing their consent to colonial rule. 60
The European powers did in many instances negotiate treaties with
native rulers in order to secure territory or limited rights in
territory. 61 However, the treaties, often negotiated under duress,62
were never assumed to be
the sole or sufficient basis for the full
63
extension of colonial rule.
57. This view is evident in the works of late 19th-early 20th century legal theorists.

See, e.g., JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13645 (1894); OPPENHEIM, supra note 19, at 134-35, 383-84 (3d ed. 1920); see also W. E.
HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 47-49 (P. Higgins ed., 8th ed. 1924). See
generally GERRIT W. GONG, THE
SOCIETY (1984).

STANDARD OF "CIVILIZATION" IN INTERNATIONAL

58. See L. H. Gann, The Berlin Conference and Humanitarian Conscience, in
BISMARCK, EUROPE AND AFRICA 321, 329-30 (Stig Forster et al. eds., 1988); THE
SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: DOCUMENTS ON THE BERLIN WEST AFRICAN CONFERENCE AND

RELATED SUBJECTS 1884-1885, at 291 (R. J. Gavin & J. A. Betley eds., 1973).

59. See General Act of the Berlin Conference, art. 6, reprinted in THE SCRAMBLE
FOR AFRICA, supra note 58, at 291 (encouraging the promotion of the "blessings of
civilization"). See generally PAUL G. LAUREN, POWER AND PREJUDICE: THE POLITICS
AND DIPLOMACY OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 32-43 (1988) (discussing European
ideologies that rendered non-white races inferior).
60. This is reflected in Snow's early twentieth century narrative concerning the

"founding of the independent state of the Congo." ALPHEUS H. SNOW, THE QUESTION
OF ABORIGINES IN THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF NATIONS 129-154 (1974 ed.) (1919). See
also ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT 59225 (1991) (explaining justifications invoked by Europeans for colonization).

61. See C. H. Alexandrowicz, The Role of Treaties in the European-African
Confrontationin the Nineteenth Century, in AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL HISTORY
27 (A.K. Mensah-Brown ed., 1975); SHAW, supra note 56, at 38-45.

62. SHAW, supra note 56, at 42-43. See also MARK F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION
AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 175 (1926)
(noting that treaties with "a backward people" were not disregarded on the grounds
that they were negotiated under duress).
63. See Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 INT'LARB. AWARDS 831 (1928) (the
tribunal held the Netherlands to have established sovereignty to the Island of Palmas
on the basis of effective occupation and display of authority over the island; treaties of
cession with native rulers were mere "facts" to be taken into account).
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In the modern era of self-determination, the international
community has rejected the theoretical grounding for colonization. 64
This rejection, together with a virtual absence of ongoing patterns of
colonization in the classical sense, indicates that the world
community now holds in contempt the imposition of government
structures upon people, regardless of their social or political makeup. 65 The world community now appears generally to accept
President Woodrow Wilson's admonition, made in the context of
elaborating upon his view of self-determination in the midst of the
European turmoil of World War I, that "no right anywhere exists to
hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were
property." 66
Today, procedures toward the creation or territorial extension of
governmental authority are regulated by self-determination precepts
requiring minimum levels of participation on the part of all affected,
as evident in the context of European integration. The steps of
institution building within the umbrella of the European
Community have been taken through processes of consultation
involving government representatives who are presumed to be acting
not simply on behalf of their state governments, but more
fundamentally on behalf of the people of the countries they
represent. 67 The Treaty of Rome, 68 the basic constitutive instrument
of the Community, and the recently debated Maastricht Treaty, 69
which would enlarge the Community's competencies, have been
subject to review by national legislatures and in some instances,
64. See LAUREN, supra note 59, at 150-65 (discussing government statements at the

San Francisco Conference which gave rise to the U.N. Charter); Declarationon the
Grantingof Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note 6 (declaring,
inter alia, that "[tlhe subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and
exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights"); U.N. Centre for
Human Rights, The Effects of Racism and Racial Discriminationon the Social and
Economic Relations Between Indigenous Peoples and States: Report of a Seminar, at 8,
U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/89/5 (1989) ("The concept of 'terra nullius,' 'conquest' and
'discovery' as modes of territorial acquisition are repugnant, have no legal standing,
and are entirely without merit or justification").
65. Accordingly, under modern conceptions of terra nullius, territory is not legally
vacant if inhabited by human beings even if they are not organized as a "sovereign"
entity. See Western SaharaCase, supra note 6, at 39-40 (finding the Western Sahara
not to be terranullius at the time of its colonization by Spain, a finding not premised on
the character of the political organization of the territory).
66. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress (May 1917), quoted in
UMOZURIKE, supra note 10, at 14.
67. For background on the development of the European community, see P.S.R.F.
MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 1-14 (5th ed. 1990).
68. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY.

69. Maastricht Treaty, reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 247.
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popular referenda. 70 Furthermore, the territorial expansion of the
jurisdiction of the European Community-that is, the expansion of
community membership-has occurred only following
similar
71
procedures of broad consultation involving all concerned.
Self-determination precepts also are apparent in constitutive
procedures of disintegration. In a recent survey of international
practice, Professor Thomas Franck concludes that the international
system does not provide a freestanding right of secession. 72 As recent
events tell, nonetheless, political movements may well result in the
breakup of states, and it is increasingly apparent that in such
instances the international community expects the outcome to be
minimally grounded in democratic procedures that can be said to
reflect the aspirations of the people concerned. 7 3 International
recognition of states emerging from the dissolution of the former
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia followed referenda or
other expressions of popular support by the constituents of the
70. The Maastricht Treaty requires Member States to ratify according to their
respective constitutional requirements. Id. art. R. See, e.g., The Maastricht Bill:
Sometime, Never?, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 1993, at 64 (discussing British
parliamentary procedures for ratifying the Maastricht treaty); European Union:
Germany and Greece Kick Off MaastrichtRatification,EuR. REP., July 24, 1992, at No.
1788 (discussing German and Greek procedures for ratification).
71. See, e.g., Paul Lewis, Common Market to Discuss Entry of New Members, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 1984, at Al; Edward Schumacher, For Spain and Portugal,Isolation is
About to End, N.Y. TnviEs, July 8, 1985, at A6.
72. See Thomas M. Franck, Post Modern Tribalism and the Right to Secession 20
(draft of a chapter for the General Course in Public International Law to be given at the
Hague Academy of International Law, 1993) (on file with author) ("The international
system does not recognize a general right of secession but may assist the government
of a state which is a member in good standing to find constructive alternatives to a
secessionist claim"). See also HALPERIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 27-44 (discussing
international responses to recent secessionist efforts). Compare infra notes 108 and
accompanying text on secession as a potential remedy in limited contexts of persistent
violation of the substantive elements of self-determination.
73. Thus, the "common position on the process of recognition" adopted by the
European Community reads in part:
The [European] Community and its member States confirm their
attachment to the principles of the Helsinki Act and the Charter of
Paris, in particular the principle of self-determination. They affirm
their readiness to recognize, subject to the normal standards of
international practice and the political realities in each case, those
new States which, following the historic changes in the region, have
constituted themselves on a democratic basis ...
Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet
Union, adopted by the Council of the European Community, Dec. 17, 1991, reprintedin
EUROPE, Dec. 18, 1991., at 3-4 (emphasis added).
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nascent independent states.7 4 While popular support for a
secessionist movement is not alone sufficient for the world
community to act in favor of the movement, it is at least a necessary
condition. The ensuing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia attest to
the volatility of political dissolution and the need for the international
community to moderate disintegrative procedures more aggressively
and carefully, particularly those procedures which involve discrete
75
groups with antagonistic interests.
Minimum standards of participation may additionally be
discerned in the context of domestic constitutional reform.
Mechanisms of broad constituent consultation and participation are
the norm in the efforts at constitutional reform that have occurred
throughout the globe in recent years. A noteworthy example is the
recent constitutional reform effort in Canada. 7 6 Various interests
were accorded participation in the development of a complex reform
package. Representatives of Canada's aboriginal peoples and of
Quebec, communities that saw themselves particularly affected by
the outcome, took on especially active roles in the reform

74. The Czeck and Slovak Republics gained widespread recognition among states
and membership in the United Nations and other international organizations
immediately upon their emergence as independent states on January 1, 1993. Czechs
and Slovaks Join U.N., N.Y. TmEs, Jan. 9, 1993, at 4. For background on the political
developments leading to the break up of Czechoslovakia, see Katarina Mathernova,
Czecho? Slovakia: ConstitutionalDisappointments,7 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POLY 471
(1992). The breakup of the Czechoslovakian Federation followed supporting votes by
the elected parliamentary delegates of both the Czech and Slovak Republics. This
procedure quite arguably was not optimal insofar as it did not involve a popular vote
as required by the Czechoslovakian Constitution; initiatives for a popular referendum
were rejected. Nonetheless, the procedures apparently were sufficient from the
standpoint of the people concerned, given their apparent acquiescence in and even
enthusiasm for the decision ultimately made. For criticism of the procedures leading to
the dissolution of the Czechoslovakian federation, see, e.g., Adrian Bridge, Few Cheers
as Two New States are Born, INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 31, 1992, at 14; Eric
Bourne, Public Doubts Mark Eve of the Dissolutionof Czech-Slovak State, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 15, 1992, at 5; Andrew Cohen, Leaders FailedTheir People with a
'Velvet Divorce,' FIN. POST, Jan. 8, 1993, at 9. For a chronology of European
Community, CSCE, and U.N. actions concerning Yugoslavia, see Marc Weller, Current
Developments Note, The InternationalResponse to the Dissolution of the Socialist
FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569 (1992).
75. See generally Hurst Hannum, Self-Determination, Yugoslavia, and Europe:
Old Wine in New Bottles?, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 57 (1993); Danilo Tiirk,
Remarks Concerning the Breakup of the Former Yugoslavia, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 49 (1993).
76. For background on the recent constitutional reform effort in Canada, see The
Constitutional Debate:A Straight Talking Guide for Canadians,MACLEANS, July 6,
1992, at 1.
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negotiations. 77 Ultimately, the reform package was submitted to
Canadian voters in a popular referendum. The voters, including a
majority of aboriginal and Quebecois voters, rejected the proposal
and sent the process back to square one, as was their prerogative
pursuant to precepts of self-determination. 78 Although complaints
abound on the part of some interests that their participation in the
reform process has been inadequate, 7 9 and indeed some complaints
may well be justified, it is evident that the underlying premise has
been to accord some meaningful level of participation to all
individuals and groups concerned commensurate with their
interests. Especially under scrutiny for its treatment of aboriginal
peoples, the Canadian government made a point of reporting to
international human rights bodies its inclusion of aboriginal
representatives in the constitutional talks.8 0
Similarly, the government of Colombia has reported to
international bodies the participatory mechanisms used to achieve
the 1991 reform of its constitution, in addition to reporting the
substance of the reforms.8 1 Highlighted in its report to the U.N.
Working Group on Indigenous Populations were mechanisms to
allow representatives of indigenous communities meaningful
82
participation in the reform effort.

77. See id. Dalee Sambo discusses the participation of aboriginal peoples'
representatives in the Canadian constitutional reform effort in her article in this
volume. Dalee Sambo, Indigenous Peoples and International Standard-Setting
Processes:Are State Governments Listening?, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 13
(1993). See also Mary Ellen Turpel, Indigenous Peoples' Rights of Political
Participationand Self-Determination: Recent InternationalLegal Developments and
the ContinuingStruggle for Recognition, 25 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 579, 593-94 (1992).
78. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, CanadiansReject CharterChanges, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
27, 1992, at Al; Jack Aubry, Native Voters Said No Despite Historic Gains, OTTAWA
CITIZEN, Oct. 28, 1992, at Al.
79. For example, although the major aboriginal peoples organizations, including
the Assembly of First Nations, participated prominently in the constitutional reform
effort, Mikmaq representatives complained that the participation accorded them was
not sufficient.
80. See, e.g., Statement by the Observer Delegation of Canada, U.N. Working
Group on Indigenous Populations, at 4-5 (July 28, 1992, Geneva) (Statement by Gerald
E. Shannon) (on file with author).
81. See, e.g., Declaraci6n de Colombia sobre la Situacidn de la Promoci6n y
Protecci6n de los Derechos de los Indigenas, Tema 5 de la Agenda de la Subcomisi6n
de Prevenci6n de Discriminacionesy Protecci6n a las Minorias, Statement to the U.N.
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, at 82 (July 30, 1991, Geneva) (on file with
author).
82. Id. at 2.
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2. Ongoing Self-Determination
Apart from its constitutive aspect, which applies at discrete
episodes of institutional birth or change, self-determination applies
continuously in what I have designated its ongoing aspect. Ongoing
self-determination requires a governing institutional order under
which individuals and groups are able to make meaningful choices
in matters touching upon all spheres of life on a continuous basis. In
the words of the self-determination provision common to the
International Human Rights Covenants and other instruments,
peoples are to "freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."8 3 In this respect as well, the international
community's condemnation of colonialism represents a minimum
standard.
At the height of the decolonization movement in the 1950s and
1960s, the political theory that supported colonialism had long been
discredited and had faded in light of the major contending political
theories of the time: Western democracy, Marxism, and variations
thereof. Despite the divergence of mid-twentieth century political
theory that fueled the polarization of geopolitical forces until
recently, there was coincidence in precepts of freedom and equality
upon which the international community viewed colonialism as an
84
oppressive form of governance, independently of its origins.
Whether viewed through the lens of Marxism or Western democratic
theory, the colonial structures were regarded negatively for
depriving the indigenous inhabitants of self-government in favor of
administration ultimately under the control and for the benefit of the
peoples of the colonizing states.8 5 (Hence the term "non-selfgoverning territories" was appropriated to designate the
86
beneficiaries of decolonization.)
83. InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights, supra note 16,
art. 1; InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, supra note 16, art. 1. For the
full text of article 1, para. 1 of the Covenants see supra note 16. See also U.N.
Declarationon Friendly Relations, supra note 16.
84. Compare, for example, Stalin's anti-colonial statements in STALIN, supra note
14, at 314-22, with the policy prescriptions of United States leaders as summarized in
OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 33, at 99-100.
85. See generally OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 33, at 99-128; LAUREN, supra note
59, at 205-06.
86. Chapter XII of the U.N. Charter concerns obligations of member states with
regard to "Non-Self-Governing Territories," which territories were generally
understood at the time of the Charter's adoption to include territories of a classical
colonial type. See OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 33, at 104-113. The criteria for
identifying non-self-governing territories subject to UN-promoted decolonization
procedures were set forth in G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 14,
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The normative nexus by which the international community
deemed classical colonialism an illegitimate form of governance also
has operated against systems of apartheid, most notably South
Africa's. As previously noted, the international community has
deemed South Africa's system of racial segregation and white
87
minority rule to violate the self-determination of the black majority.
Two significant developments in dominant conceptions about the
requirements of governmental legitimacy have emerged since the
height of the decolonization movement, developments which have
expanded the common denominator of global opinion that defines the
normative content of self-determination particularly in its ongoing
aspect. One is the dramatic decline of Marxism, accompanied by a
worldwide movement toward an ever greater embrace of nonauthoritarian democratic institutions.8 8 Especially since the demise
of the Soviet Union, this democratic movement is reflected in
developments worldwide8 9 and has been promoted through the
United Nations and other international institutions. 9 0 Accordingly,
there is a budding scholarly literature articulating emerging rights
of "political participation" and "democratic governance" under
international law. 9 1 Closely linked with modern precepts of
democracy is the idea that, consistent with the values promoted by
patterns of political integration, decisions should be made at the
most local level possible.9 2 Thus, for example, an important part of
at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
87. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
88. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The End of History and
the New World Order: The Triumph of Capitalism and the Competition Between
Liberalism and Democracy, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 277 (1992).

89. See Mark Falcoff, The DemocraticProspect in Latin America, WASH. Q., Spring
1990; ELIE ABIEL, THE SHATTERED BLOC: BEHIND THE UPHEAVAL IN EASTERN EUROPE
(1990); Carol Lancaster, Democracy in Africa, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1991-92;
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991).

90. See David Stoelting, The Challenge of UN-Monitored Elections in Independent
Nations, 28 STANFORD J. INT'L L. 371, 375 (1992) (discussing the "United Nations'
emerging role in monitoring independent states' elections" in the context of "an
emerging right to political participation under international law"); HALPERIN ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 63 (discussing Organization of American States resolutions deploring
authoritarian coups against elected officials in Haiti and Peru).
91. See, e.g., HALPERIN ETAL., supranote 2,.at 420-424; Gregory H. Fox, The Right
to PoliticalParticipationin InternationalLaw, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539 (1992); Thomas
M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 1M. J. INT'L L. 46
(1992).
92. Emphasis within Western democratic theory on the importance of local
government within a larger political framework is longstanding. See MARK TUSHNET,
RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4-17 (1988)
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the Russian Federation's reform movement is the devolution of
authority to its constituent parts. 93 And while Europe moves toward
greater integration, the principle of "subsidiarity" has taken hold to
guard against unnecessary centralization of power that might come
at the expense of local units of governance. 94 As already noted,
indigenous communities of North America and elsewhere
traditionally have maintained decentralized systems of
95
governance.
A second major development is the ever greater embrace of
notions of cultural pluralism. Contemporaneous with the early
periods of the decolonization movement, previously existing and
newly emergent states held out assimilation and rights of full
citizenship as means of bringing the members of culturally
distinctive groups within self-determination's fold of freedom and
equality. 96 The ideal model was that of the culturally homogenous
independent nation-state. To the extent the international community
valued cultural diversity, it favored European cultural minorities
within European states, but even then only with minimal results. 97
Over the last several years the international community
increasingly has come to value and promote the integrity of diverse
cultures, including non-European cultures. This tendency is
manifested not in a growing sentiment in favor of independent
statehood for each of the world's cultural or ethnic groups, but
rather in a discernible trend in the world's multiple systems of
governance toward the accommodation of diverse cultural
(discussing the dominant strands of political theory adopted by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution). For a British perspective, see DILYS M. HILL, DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1974). See generaly FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION:
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF TERRITORIAL DECENTRALIZATION IN FEDERAL AND
CENTRALIZED STATES (Thomas Fleiner-Gerster & Silvan Hutler eds., 1987) (Reports

from the Regional Conference of the Int'l Assoc. of Constitutional Law in Murten,
Switzerland, 1984).
93. See David K. Shipler, FourFuturesfor Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1993, at § 6,
at 28.
94. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE PRINCIPLE OF
SUBSIDIARITY: COMMUNICATION OF THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1992) (on file with author); See also European Union:

Commission Report on Subsidiarity,EUR. REP., Nov. 3, 1992, no. 1808, available in
LEXIS, Ne-is Library, EURRPT File (summarizing EC Commission report).
95. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
96. "Nation-building" was a euphemism for policies of breaking down competing
ethnic or cultural bonds. RODOLFO STAVENHAGEN, THE ETHNIC QUESTION: CONFLICTS,
DEVELOPMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 5-6, U.N. Sales No. E.90 III.A.9 (1990).

97. See HANNUM, supra note 7, at 49-53 (discussing the "ultimate failure" of the
post World War I minority rights treaties).
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identities. 9s This break from the decolonization era model of statecentered homogeneity is promoted by the international community
through its emboldened system of minority rights protections 99 and
the burgeoning body of international norms to protect the integrity
and survival of indigenous communities. 10 0
98. See Anaya, supra note 30, at 33-34 (discussing a "worldwide trend... [in the]
use of constitutional, legislative, and other official measures to reorder governing
institutional matrixes in response to indigenous peoples' demands"); -LNNUM, supra
note 7, at 247-79 (discussing developments in Scandinavian countries and in Spain).
99. At its forty-seventh session in 1992 the U.N. General Assembly adopted the
Declarationon the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and
Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/135
(1992). The declaration is essentially an elaboration upon article 27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, supra note 16, which provides:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own
language.
Article 27 has been the grounds for decisions by the U.N. Human Rights Committee
favorable to demands of cultural survival. See, e.g., Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake
Band v. Canada,Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex L,
U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (1990) (cultural rights guarantees extended to protect Indian band's
subsistence activities associated with woodlands); Kitok v. Sweden, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex VII.G, 9.2, U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988)
(article 27 extends to economic activity "where that activity is an essential element in
the culture of an ethnic community").
For a description of the minority rights regimes developing within the framework
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and within the framework of
the Council of Europe, see HALPERIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 57-60. See also PATRICK
THORNBERRY, MINORITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (1991).

100. In 1989 the International Labour Organisation adopted its Convention No. 169
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989
(entered into force Sept. 5, 1990). Ambassador Espafia-Smith of Bolivia, the chair of the
ILO Conference Committee that drafted Convention No. 169, described the thrust of
the Convention as follows:
The proposed Convention takes as its basic premise respect for the
specific characteristics of the differences among indigenous and
tribal peoples in cultural, social and economic spheres. It consecrates
respect for the integrity of the value, practices and institutions of
these peoples in the general framework of guarantees enabling them
to maintain their own different identities and ensuring selfidentification, totally exempt from pressures which might lead to
forced assimilation, but without ruling out the possibility of their
integration with other societies and lifestyles as long as this is freely
and voluntarily chosen.
International Labour Conference, Provisional Record 31, 76th Sess., at 3114 (1989).
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Many have viewed the minority and indigenous rights regimes
as existing apart from the concept of self-determination. This view,
however, does not fully appreciate the relationship between cultural
integrity precepts, which are central to the minority and indigenous
rights regimes, and notions of freedom and equality implicit in the
concept of self-determination. If the cultures of diverse groups are
not valued, neither are their distinctive ways of life or interactive
patterns which extend well into the social and political realms.' 0 1
Under such a perceptual gloss, freedom and equality may be
considered satisfied by simple inclusion of the groups' individual
members as participants in political systems based on traditional
Western liberal conceptions of democracy (or, until recently, Marxist
proletarianism). But once diverse cultural groupings are
acknowledged and valued, their associational patterns and
community aspirations become factors that must be reflected in the
governing institutional order if self-determination notions are to
prevail.
Accordingly, the contemporary global trend is toward securing
for cultural groups and their members contextually appropriate
accommodations in the governing order. A number of groups,
particularly indigenous peoples, are pursuing spheres of autonomy
over a range of policy and administrative matters, while at the same
time enhancing their effective participation in all decisions affecting
them left to the larger institutions of government.' 0 2 Although there
Indigenous peoples' rights have been the focus of considerable discussion within
the United Nations, particularly its Working Group on Indigenous Populations, a suborgan of the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities. For background on the U.N. focus on indigenous peoples, see Robert A.
Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of InternationalHuman Rights Law:
Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J.
660, 676-85. Since 1985 the U.N Working Group on Indigenous Populations has been
drafting, in consultation with member states and indigenous peoples' representatives, a
declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples for adoption by the U.N. General
Assembly. See id. at 676-82. Although there is still a divergence of views about the
precise language of the declaration, states have joined indigenous rights advocates in
expressing widespread agreement with core precepts of indigenous cultural survival.
See Analytical Compilation of Observationsand Comments Received Pursuantto SubComm'n Resolution 1988/18, U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Hum. Rts. 41st Sess., Agenda
Item 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN..4/Sub.2/1989/33/Add.1-3 (1989) (synthesizing government
and non-governmental organization comments to the Working Group); Report of the
Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Tenth Session, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/33 (1992). See generally Anaya, supra note 30 (discussing new and
emergent conventional and customary norms concerning indigenous peoples).
101. On the relationship between culture and social and political spheres, see
generally STAVENHAGEN, supra note 96.
102. See Anaya, supra note 30, at 32-33 & nn. 140-45 (discussing developments in
Nicaragua, Colombia, Canada, Australia, Philippines, Norway, Bangladesh, the former
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is no one formula of structural accommodation in this global trendand indeed the very fact of the diversity of cultures and their
surrounding circumstances belies a singular formula-the
underlying and increasingly widespread premise is that of
promoting the free development of diverse cultures.
The norm of self-determination, therefore, promotes an ongoing
condition of freedom and equality among and within peoples in
relation to the institutions of government under which they live, a
condition today substantially defined by precepts of democracy and
cultural pluralism. The norm thus understood is reflected in
Colombia's 1991 statements to the U.N. Working Group on
Indigenous Populations as well as in its recent third periodic report
to the U.N. Human Rights Committee concerning compliance with
its obligations under the self-determination provision of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Colombian
government reported on its newly revised constitution, emphasizing
its guarantees of democracy as well as pointing out aspects of the
constitution's political-administrative subdivision of the country
calculated to promote the free
development of indigenous
103
communities and their cultures.
In a world of interconnected and overlapping spheres of
authority, self-determination can be seen to empower human beings
with regard to all levels of governance, from the most local to the
most encompassing. The democratic institutions of states and their
political subdivisions are complemented by the substantially
democratic procedures ordained for decision-making within the
United Nations and other international institutions. 10 4 Today's
international institutions remain substantially state-centered, thus
limiting the opportunity for direct participation in international
governance by non-state interests and groups. 10 5 The United Nations
and other major international bodies, however, increasingly allow
for some level of participation by non-state groups in respect to issues
about which they are particularly interested. 106 Traditionally,
Soviet Union, and Honduras).
103. See Declaraci6nde Colombia, supra note 81; HIGGINS, supra note 31, at 4.
104. For a description of decision-making procedures in the United Nations and
other major intergovernmental bodies, see D. W. BOWETT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS (4th ed. 1982).

105. See generally CHIANG PEI-HEING, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AT
THE UNITED NATIONS: IDENTITY, ROLE, AND FUNCTION (1981); PHILLIP TAYLOR, NONSTATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1984).
106. For example, indigenous peoples and their organizations have participated
actively in discussions within the United Nations concerning the development of an
indigenous rights declaration and related topics. See Williams, supra note 100, at 67685. Under article 71 of the U.N Charter, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may
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individuals and sub-state groups are presumed represented in
international organizations by their respective states. As the
international community becomes increasingly attentive to nonstate-centered patterns of association and interests, selfdetermination precepts will promote increasing opportunity for nonstate groups to participate in decision-making in international
settings.
In summary, the international norm of self-determination
entails a universe of precepts extending from core values of freedom
and equality and applying in favor of human beings in regard to the
institutions of government under which they live. In its constitutive
aspect, the norm entitles individuals and groups to meaningful
participation in episodic procedures leading to the creation of or
change in the governing institutional order. In its ongoing aspect,
self-determination requires that the governing institutional order
itself be one in which individuals and groups live and develop freely
on a continuous basis.
B. Self-Determination Remedies
Where substantive elements of the norm of self-determination
are violated, a remedy should be forthcoming. The prescriptions
promoted through the international system to undo colonization,
while not themselves equal to the norm of self-determination, were
contextually specific remedial prescriptions arising from
colonialism's deviation from the generally applicable norm. As we
have seen, the violation of the norm was in both self-determination's
constitutive and ongoing aspects. Although the violation of
constitutive self-determination in the colonial context was mostly an
historical one, it was linked to a contemporary condition of
oppression including the denial of ongoing self-determination.
obtain consultative status with the U.N. Economic and Social Council, and pursuant to
such status NGOs have gained increasing influence in U.N. deliberations. See generally
PEI-HEING, supra note 105. The U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations
allows all indigenous groups to participate in its deliberations, regardless of official
U.N. status. Similarly, the International Labour Organisation relaxed its rules of
procedures in order to allow indigenous groups limited direct participation in the
development of ILO Convention No. 169. See Lee Swepston, A New Step in the
InternationalLaw on Indigenous and TribalPeoples: ILO Convention No. 169 of 1989,
15 OKLA. CiTY U. L. REV. 677, 686-87 (1990). In general, the ILO procedures depart
notably from the mostly state-centered models of decision-making of the United
Nations and other international organizations. The ILO employs a "tripartite" system
of governance such that not all the delegates to the ILO governing organs are
representatives of governments; voting delegates also include representatives of
worker organizations and representatives of employer groups. See BOWETT,supra note
104, at 141.

158

TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 3:131

Significantly, the remedy for this infraction of self-determination
did not entail a reversion to the status quo prior to the historical
patterns of colonization but rather to the creation of an altogether
new institutional order viewed as appropriate to "implementing"
self-determination. Ongoing self-determination-a governing
institutional order in which people may freely develop-was deemed
implemented for a colonial territory through "(a) [e]mergence as a
sovereign independent State; (b) [firee association with an
independent State; or (c) [iintegration with an independent State" on
the basis of equality.1 0 7 And because the decolonization remedy itself
involved change in the governing institutional order, constitutive
self-determination dictated deference to the aspirations of the people
concerned for the purposes of arriving at the appropriate
institutional arrangement. In most instances, independent
statehood was the presumed or express preference.
To the extent the international community is generally
concerned with the promotion of self-determination precepts, and as
it expands its common understanding about those precepts, it may
identify other contextual deviations from self-determination and
promote appropriate remedies. With appropriate attentiveness to the
particular character of deviant conditions or events, and with an
understanding of the interconnected character of virtually all forms
of modern human association, these remedies need not entail the
formation of new states. Secession, however, may be an appropriate
remedy in limited contexts (as opposed to a generally available
"right") where substantive self-determination for a particular group
cannot otherwise be ensured.1 0 8
The case of the Indians of the Atlantic Coast region of Nicaragua
illustrates the kind of remedial measures promoted by the
international system in the post-colonial era. The Atlantic Coast
region was incorporated within the Nicaraguan state by a series of
nineteenth century events devoid of minimal procedures of

107. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 86, at princ. IV. See

OFUATEY-KODJOE,

supra note

33, at 115-28 (concluding that G.A. Res. 1541 is generally reflective of international
practice in the application of the principle of self-determination to the colonial

territories).
108. See LEE

C.

BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION

222 (1978) (arguing thaf international law provides for "remedial secession" in
extreme cases of oppression); Ved Nanda, Self-Determination Outside the Colonial
Context: The Birth of Bangladesh in Retrospect, in SELF DETERMINATION: NATIONAL,
REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 35, at 193, 204 (stating that secession
may properly follow a persistent pattern of human rights abuses against a group); see

also ALLEN

BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM FORT

SUMTER TO LITHUANIA & QUEBEC 38-45 (1991) (synthesizing arguments for secession,
all of which relate to rectifying some form of injustice).
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consultation with the indigenous population. 10 9 In the aftermath of
the imposed incorporation, the indigenous Miskito, Sumo, and
Rama Indians of the Atlantic Coast have lived at the margins of
Nicaraguan society in terms of basic social welfare conditions. 1 10
Moreover, having retained their distinct indigenous identities, the
Indians have suffered the imposition of government structures that
have inhibited their capacity to exist and develop freely as distinct
cultural communities. 1 1 1 Hence it can be said that the Indians of the
Atlantic Coast have been deprived of self-determination in both its
constitutive and ongoing aspects, especially if ongoing selfdetermination is understood to include precepts of cultural
pluralism.
Not long after the revolutionary Sandinista government took
power in 1979, it faced demands for political autonomy on the part of
the Atlantic Coast indigenous communities. Early resistance to the
demands led to a period of turmoil, exacerbated by the civil war that
gripped the country during the 1980s. The Indians took their case to
the Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American
States, asserting violations of their human rights including the right
to self-determination. 1 12 Effectively equating self-determination with
decolonization procedures, the Commission found that the Indians
were not self-determination beneficiaries. 1 13 However, defying its
own formalism, the Commission acknowledged the inequitable
condition of the Indians dating from their forced incorporation into
the Nicaraguan state and found that their ability to develop freely in
cultural and economic spheres was suppressed by the existing
political order. 114 The Commission thus suggested the elaboration of
109. The history of the Atlantic Coast region is summarized in
MOLIERI, EL DESAFIO INDIGENA EN NICARAGUA: EL CASO DE LOS MISKITOS

JORGE JENKINS

33-114 (1986);

Theodore Macdonald, The Moral Economy of the Miskito Indians: Local Roots of
Geopolitical Conflict, in ETHNICITIES AND NATIONS: PROCESSES OF INTERETHNIC
RELATIONS IN LATIN AiERICA, SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THE PACIFIC 107, 155-22 (Remo
Guidieri et al. eds., 1988).
110. See MOLIERI, supra note 109, at 175-229 (discussing the social and economic
conditions in the Atlantic Coast region at the time of the 1979 revolution in Nicaragua).
111. See John N. Burnstein, Note, Ethnic Minoritiesand the Sandinist Government,.
36 J. INT'L AFF. 155, 155-59 (1982) (discussing the imposition of government structures
both before and after the 1979 revolution).
112. OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation
of Human Rights of a Segment of the NicaraguanPopulation of Miskito Origin and
Resolution on the Friendly Settlement Procedure Regarding the Human Rights
Situation of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Populationof Miskito Origin, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., OAS Doe. No. OEA/Ser.LV/II.62, doc. 10 rev.3 (1983), OEA/Ser.I/V/II.62, doc.
26 (1984).
113. Id. at 78-81.
114. Id. at 1-7, 81.
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a new political order for the Indians 1 1 5-in effect, a remedy to
implement an ongoing condition of self-determination where it had
been denied. And in accordance with precepts of constitutive selfdetermination, which also had been denied, the Commission further
held that such a remedy "can only effectively carry out its assigned
purposes to the extent it is designed in the context of broad
consultation, and carried out with the direct participation of the
ethnic minorities of Nicaragua, through their freely chosen
1 16
representatives."
Following the Commission's decision, the Nicaraguan
government entered into negotiations with Indian leaders and
eventually developed a constitutional and legislative regime of
political and administrative autonomy for the Indian-populated
Atlantic Coast region of the country.1 1 7 Although the autonomy
regime is widely acknowledged to be faulty, and its implementation
has been difficult, it nonetheless is by most accounts a step in the
right direction. More significantly for the present purposes, it
illustrates the kind of context-specific remedies that may be
promoted through the international community in response to a selfdetermination claim.
Sovereignty precepts form a backdrop and potentially limiting
factor for the elaboration of self-determination remedies within the
international system. The limitations of the state-centered doctrine
of sovereignty are essentially twofold. First, the doctrine limits the
capacity of the international system to regulate matters within the
spheres of authority asserted by states recognized by the
international community. This limitation upon international
competency is reflected in the U.N. Charter's admonition against
intervention "in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state. 1 1 8 Second, sovereignty upholds a substantive preference
for the status quo of political ordering through its corollaries
protective of state territorial integrity and political unity.1 19
Under modern international law, however, the doctrine of
sovereignty and its Charter affirmations are conditioned by the
human rights values also expressed in the Charter and embraced by
the international community. 120 In a global community that
115. Id. at 81-82.
116. Id. at 82.
117. See Macdonald, supra note 109, at 107.
118. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
119. These corollaries also are reflected in the charter. See id. art. 2, 4 (stating that
"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state...").
120. See HANNUM, supranote 7, at 19-20. See also Report of the Secretary General:
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remains organized substantially by state jurisdictional boundaries,
sovereignty principles continue, in some measure, to advance
human values of stability and ordered liberty. Thus in both its
traditional and modern formulations, sovereignty principles guard
the people within a state against disruptive forces coming from
outside the state's domestic domain. But since the atrocities and
suffering of the two world wars, international law does not much
uphold sovereignty principles when they would serve as an
accomplice to the subjugation of human rights or act as a shield
against international concern that coalesces to promote human
rights. The proliferation of a floor of human rights norms that are
deemed applicable to all states as to their own citizens and the
decolonization remedy itself both demonstrate the yielding of
sovereignty principles to human rights imperatives in modern
international law. Ideally, then, sovereignty principles and human
rights precepts, including the norm of self-determination, work in
tandem to promote a stable and peaceful world. Where there is a
trampling of self-determination, however, the presumption in favor
of non-intervention, territorial integrity, or political unity of existing
states may be offset to the extent required by an appropriate self12 1
determination remedy.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing portrays a norm of self-determination that benefits
all segments of humanity, by virtue of their humanity. In a diverse
yet interconnected world with overlapping spheres of authority and
community, all are entitled to participate equally in the constitution
and development of the governing institutional order under which
they live and, further, to live continuously within a governing order
in which freedom abounds. Self-determination includes the right of
cultural groupings to the political institutions necessary to allow
them to exist and develop freely according to their distinctive
characteristics. It is in this way that we may understand selfdetermination to be a right of "all peoples" without formalistic
attempts to narrowly define the term "peoples." Rather the term
An Agenda for Peace; Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 10; U.N. Doc. A/47/277 (1992).
121. Cf. U.N. Declarationon Friendly Relations, supra note 16, princ. V (which
includes the following along with the affirmation of the principle of self-determination:
"Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples") (emphasis added).
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"peoples" is appropriately understood as simply denoting the
collective character of the human impulse toward self-determination
and as affirming the value of community bonds, notwithstanding
traditional categories of human organization associated with
statehood or sovereignty.
To say that literally all peoples have the right to selfdetermination, however, is not to say that all are entitled to a selfdetermination remedy. A remedy is only possible if there is a
violation of the norm. In the context of classical colonialism, a
remedial regime was developed to address the particular
dysfunction widely identified with that genre of political ordering.
Whether in any other situation there is a violation of selfdetermination, and if so, the particular remedy that might be
forthcoming, must be determined according to the relevant
circumstances. What is called for, then, is a case-by-case approach
to address the multitude of contemporary group demands that
invoke the principle or right of self-determination.
Admittedly, like many fundamental juridical principles or
doctrines, the international norm of self-determination as
articulated here is lacking in specificity and hence is of limited
utility for prescribing results in the abstract. Nonetheless, the norm
has a core of certainty about it, particularly in the framework it
provides for evaluating group demands and for promoting peaceful
solutions in concrete situations. This framework is in the following
inquiries and attendant considerations.
1. Has there been a violation of self-determination?
This inquiry has two parts:
1(a). Is there a violation of self-determination in its constitutive
aspect? More particularly, the question is whether the claimant
group or its members have been denied meaningful participation in
discrete episodes that have given rise to or changed the governing
institutional order under which they live. An extreme form of such
denial is where a government has extended its rule over an
inhabited territory without regard for the wishes of the people
already living in the territory. In such a situation, whether or not
there was a prior sovereignty in the territory is not necessarily a
controlling factor; what matters is that human beings, however
organized (or not organized), were not sufficiently consulted. This of
course was the experience of peoples living under classical
colonialism, and it is also characteristic of the past of other groups
now asserting self-determination, including groups now
denominated in international discourse as "indigenous" and some
European minorities who were unwitting victims of territorial
transfers. The proximity in time to a violation of constitutive self-
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determination is a factor in assessing the weight to be accorded the
violation. In general, the farther away in time, the less
consequential the violation is for contemporary life. This
presumption diminishes, however, in the degree to which the
victims or their progeny remain differentiated from others by
inequitable conditions traceable to the past wrong or have persisted
in protesting the violation.
1(b) Is there a violation of self-determination in its ongoing
aspect? This inquiry focuses on the contemporary day-to-day life of
the claimant group and its members, as related to the form and
functioning of the governing institutional order under which they
live. Relevant here are the stories, which are usually central to selfdetermination claims, about oppressive government that impedes
the ability of a group to develop freely in all spheres of life-stories of
discrimination, suppression of democratic participation, and
cultural suffocation. Ideally the life of any group of people should be
governed by truly democratic institutions that maximize local
decision-making and that appropriately reflect the group's character
and cultural preferences. Culture in this context should be
understood to mean more than narrow categories of language,
religion, ritual, art, or philosophy. Culture may also include a
complex web of interrelationships, land use patterns, and
institutions that extend into political and economic spheres.
2. If there has been an infraction of self-determination, what is the
appropriateremedy?
The goal in fashioning an appropriate remedy is to eliminate any
existing institutional impediment to the continuous realization of
self-determination values and to undo any current inequities
resulting from past deprivations of self-determination. Remedies are
to be determined according to the particular circumstances,
including circumstances defined by cultural patterns as well as
patterns of group interdependency, and with deference to the
preferences of the aggrieved group. A wide range of possibilities
exists for developing within a remedial context a new institutional
order within which all concerned can be said to be in control of their
own destiny. Only in limited circumstances would secession be a
cure better than the disease, and even then it would most likely be
only a partial step toward the full realization of self-determination
values.
Considerations of state sovereignty will regulate the extent to
which the international community will become involved in
identifying a self-determination violation and in promoting an
appropriate remedy. But where a violation of self-determination
lingers unchecked by decision-makers within the domestic realm,
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the international community cannot remain idle. Just as
international procedures developed to undo the scourge of
colonization, international procedures must exist to ensure that
groups shown still to be particularly vulnerable to oppresive and
unresponsive governance are able to enjoy self-determination. And
precepts of state territorial integrity and political unity will properly
constrain a self-determination remedy only to the extent that such
precepts ultimately promote a peaceful, stable, and humane world.
If there is to be a new world order, the international community
cannot be deaf to the plea for self-determination.

